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I. Introduction 
Empirical studies of the electric utility industry have generally focused on one of several 
issues, such as the presence or absence of regulation-induced input mix distortions, the rules 
used to select regulated prices, whether electricity is one output or several, or the "natural- 
ness" of the electric utility monopoly.' This paper contributes a method which permits 
simultaneous estimation of demand elasticities, pricing rule parameters, and marginal rates 
of transformation within one econometric model. Since firms make input and output deci- 
sions given the demand and regulatory conditions facing them, the marginal rates of substi- 
tution and transformation are dependent on the demand elasticities of each consumer class 
and the prices permitted by regulators. Its purposes are two. 
First, I examine the appropriateness of a multiple-output model of production: is elec- 
tricity one output, or are the products sold to different consumers distinct outputs? Most, 
but not all, previous studies treat "electricity" as a homogeneous product.2 While this 
assumption may be justified for studies which deal strictly with generation of electricity, 
Joskow and Schmalensee [27, 54-5] observe3 that 
... treating diverse power systems as single-product firms operating under identical condi- 
tions is likely to produce error. The cost of an optimally designed power system depends in 
complex ways on the distribution of demand over time and space. No two power systems 
produce the same mix of products, and product mix differences affect the magnitude and 
form of optimal investments in transmission and distribution. 
I find strong evidence that the multiple-product characterization of electricity production is 
appropriate. I also find that the marginal cost of any one output depends on the levels of all 
*I have benefitted from suggestions by John Garen, Frank Gollop, Michael Haines, James Hamilton and Marlene 
Smith, and from questions raised by seminar participants at Wayne State University. The Economics Department at 
Wayne State provided computing support. I retain responsibility for any remaining errors. 
1. In a survey of early applied research, Cowing and Smith [10] mention 14 papers using four different methods 
of analysis to investigate one or more of these issues. Joskow and Schmalensee [27] discuss some more recent efforts. 
2. Multiple-output production has been analyzed for a number of industries, including railroads, by Brown, 
Caves and Christensen [7]; telecommunications, by Evans and Heckman [14]; automobile production, by Friedlaender, 
Wang and Winston [16]; and electric power, by Primeaux and Nelson [38], Eckel [13], Nelson, Roberts and Tromp [33], 
and Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani [23]. 
3. This quote is motivated by an observation in [10]. Joskow and Schmalensee also remark on the multiple- 
output nature of electric power production [27, 34]. 
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other outputs and all other inputs. In prior studies, less inclusive empirical models have 
simplified or eliminated these interrelationships. Such simplifications are a source of specifi- 
cation bias; policy implications drawn from such models may therefore be incorrect. 
The model of producer behavior is more general than that used in other studies of 
multiple-output production of electricity. Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani [23] impose separa- 
bility of inputs and outputs. Eckel [13] aggregates residential and commercial electricity 
into one output. The wholesale electricity market is omitted in both aforementioned papers 
and in Nelson, Roberts and Tromp [33]. In my research, residential and commercial elec- 
tricity are distinct outputs. I model the participation of utilities in wholesale markets. 
Second, I assess the rules underlying regulated electricity prices, recognizing the 
multiple-output character of electric power production. Once the different marginal costs 
and demand elasticities of the different products are incorporated in the analysis, the prices 
chosen by the sample firms are indistinguishable from those which would be chosen by 
profit-maximizing price-discriminating monopolists. While this result has been anticipated 
by Stigler and Friedland [40], Posner [36; 37], and Hilton [25], it has rarely appeared in 
empirical studies, principally because the methods in those studies were overly simplified. 
My method has fewer data requirements and parameters than those followed by Meyer 
and Leland [30], Nelson [34] or Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani [23]. Meyer and Leland 
estimate demand equations with standard least-squares techniques, while they construct 
surrogate marginal cost measures as different multiples of the price of fuel. Nelson employs 
marginal cost estimates derived from Primeaux and Nelson [38] and demand elasticities 
from Mount, Chapman and Tyrrell [32]. Thus, these studies do not capture the simultaneity 
of firm decision making. Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani [23] estimate both consumer demand 
equations (using standard linear regression) and marginal costs (using a translog cost func- 
tion) as separate models, although they use data from the same set of firms in all regressions. 
In addition to characterizing a simultaneous process with separate models, they must gather 
data for both a translog cost function model and a model of consumer demand. 
By contrast, I estimate the demand elasticities and marginal rates of transformation as 
part of a single model of production. The elasticities are identified as parameters within a 
system of behavioral equations, which permits a simpler model: it is not necessary to obtain 
income, substitute price, or demographic data, as required by the standard demand equation 
approach.4 Similarly, the rules used by regulators to select prices are identified as part of the 
system of equations.5 
II. Producer Behavior 
Production Theory 
Production in the electric power industry is a multiple-output process: although kilowatt- 
hours delivered to industrial, residential, commercial and wholesale customers are produced 
in large part with common facilities, they may be distinct products with different marginal 
costs and demand elasticities. 
4. Nelson, Roberts and Tromp [33] present a similar model, but based on a cost function rather than a production 
function. 
5. The model in this paper is specified for regulated electric utilities. The basic specification, without the regula- 
tory variables, can be applied to any multiproduct firm. 
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The industry's production process is thus represented by a transformation function 
involving four outputs (Q) and four inputs (X): 
Q, = G(QR, Qc , Qw , xL , x, X), (1) 
where G is a well-behaved transformation function.6 The subscripts on Q denote the indus- 
trial (I), residential (R), commercial (C) and wholesale (W) customer classes, respectively; 
the subscripts on X denote the utilities' major inputs, labor (L), fuel (F), capital (K) and 
purchased power (Z). 
Producers purchase their inputs in competitive factor markets and sell kilowatt-hours 
to a competitive wholesale market and in imperfectly competitive industrial, residential and 
commercial markets.7 Each utility is a price taker in the wholesale market and in all input 
markets; in its remaining product markets, it faces a downward sloping demand curve, 
Pm = hm(Qm,Y), with dhm/OQm <O, m = I,R,C (2) 
where Pm is the price of Qm, hm is the aggregate demand for product rn and Y is a vector of 
variables including consumers' income and the prices of other goods.8 The price elasticity of 
demand for output m is r7. 
In this model, production for each consumer class equals consumption by that class. 
The industry's inability to store electricity implies producers plan for zero inventories. 
A purely profit-maximizing firm would maximize profits, 
C,l F,Z 
r = hm(Qm,Y)Qm + PwQw- E pjXj (3) 
m = R j=L,K 
subject to the transformation frontier (1). The solution to this problem is characterized by 
the following first-order conditions.9 
aG/lQm = - [Pm(l -(l/7m))]/[PI(l - (l/r7,))], m = R, C, W; (4a) 
aG/ OX =pj/[P,(l - (l/ /))], j = L,K,F,Z. (4b) 
Equations (4) are standard: a profit-maximizing firm will choose the output mix at which 
the marginal rate of transformation between two outputs equals the relative marginal reve- 
nues, and each input such that its marginal revenue product equals its price. 
Regulatory Policy 
Equations (4) characterize the input and output choices of an unregulated profit-maximizing 
firm. Utilities, however, are regulated: the problem of characterizing this regulation is 
addressed here. 
6. Diewert [11] presents a discussion of the properties of transformation functions. 
7. Joskow and Schmalensee [27, 36-7] show that interconnected electric utilities operate most efficiently when 
the loss-adjusted marginal cost of each operating generating plant is the same. The low cost of transmitting electricity 
over long distances and the national network of interconnecting transmission facilities give a competitive character to the 
wholesale market. 
8. Existing studies of the demand for electricity generally require the researcher to control for the shift variables 
Y. The model presented in this paper makes estimation of the demand elasticities possible without attempting to obtain 
actual or proxy measures of Y. Taylor [41] surveys a number of studies and discusses elements of Y used there; some 
rather complicated specifications also appear in Meyer and Leland [30] and Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani [23]. 
9. This derivation follows from Henderson and Quandt [24, 95-100] generalized to incorporate price-making 
behavior. Expressions (4) are Kuhn-Tucker conditions which may hold as inequalities if any Qm or Xj are zero. 
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"Regulation" of the electric utilities is frequently modeled as a "rate of return" con- 
straint imposed on the profit maximizing firm. This form of regulation leads to the "Averch- 
Johnson effect" [2]: an over-intensive use of capital relative to the cost-minimizing input 
mix for the same output mix. The Averch-Johnson view of regulation has been criticized 
elsewhere. The most damaging criticism of the Averch-Johnson model is that it is too static. 
A firm's input mix at any time actually depends on past realizations and future expectations 
of regulatory policy.'? The Averch-Johnson distortion arises if investments are perfectly 
reversible or if a regulated firm makes a positive investment in every period of its life and 
the firm never incurs a loss. 
In an alternative view of regulation, the regulators are concerned primarily with price 
levels and relative prices, and secondarily with rates of return." The "rate of return con- 
straint" is satisfied through the choice of prices by regulators. This type of regulation implies 
the use of "inverse elasticity" or "Ramsey optimal" pricing as formalized by Baumol and 
Bradford [5]. Under the inverse elasticity rule,'2 
Pm[l - ((--1)/X)(1/r7,)] = MCm, m = R,C,I,W (5) 
where X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the minimum profit constraint the regu- 
lator must satisfy. The "Ramsey number" associated with this form of regulation is (X-1)/ X. 
Since the profit constraint is empirically unknown, there are no data on the Ramsey number: 
the multiplier X cannot be identified as an estimable parameter. 
Ross [39, 152] modifies inverse-elasticity pricing: "regulators choose prices to maximize 
some weighted sum of consumers' and producer's urpluses". He presents a technique for 
obtaining the regulators' weights given data on price, marginal costs, and demand elastici- 
ties. One approach that Ross uses is to weight the implied social welfare function by the 
share of each consumer class in the consumption of a good. 13 If the regulators are weighting 
deviations of prices from marginal costs by the share of consumer class m in total output, 
Sm, the relationship of price and marginal cost is given by 
Pm[1 - ((A-mSm)/X)(1/7Im)] = MCm, m = I,R,C,W (6) 
where m is the social welfare weight the regulators attach to consumption of consumer class 
m. Expressions (4) become 
dG/8Qm - [Pm(l-1(-KmS )(1/7m))]/[P(1-(1-KIS/)(1/r7I))] m = R,CW (7a) 
aG/ ax =pj/[PJ(1-(1-KISI)(1l/rI))], j= L,K,F,Z (7b) 
where Km = m / X. While neither the Lagrange multiplier X nor the social welfare weight 'm 
10. Gollop and Karlson [19] present an intertemporal model of investment in the electric power industry in order 
to overcome the problem. Their paper is a first attempt which does not incorporate the costs of adjusting investment to a 
desired level each year. 
11. Joskow [26, 298]: "Contrary to the popular view, it does not appear that regulatory agencies have been 
concerned with raising rates of return per se. The primary concern of regulatory commissions has been to keep nominal 
prices from increasing." (The emphasis is in the original work.) 
12. There are a number of different specifications for this rule. Expression (5) and subsequent discussion follow 
Ross [39]. 
13. The share weighting approach is similar to a weighting approach used by Feldstein [15] to solve an optimal 
taxation problem. Nelson [34] proposes that consumers whose share of electricity consumption is large receive price 
concessions from regulators. 
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can be identified in the estimating model, their ratio is identifiable. The weight regulators 
attach to deviations from marginal cost pricing is thus given for each consumer class by 1 - 
Km Sm. 
Another possible regulatory policy is marginal cost pricing. In this event, we would 
observe marginal rates of transformation equal to relative product prices, while the value of 
the marginal product of each input would equal its price. 
Econometric Model 
An econometric model must be derived from the multiple-output optimization problem.14 
First, the production correspondence (1) is approximated with the translog transformation 
function's 
C,W F,Z C,W 
lnQ, = + X am lnQm + E aj lnXj + 0.5 E m, In nQm nlnQ 
m = R j = L,K m n=R 
F,Z 
+ 0.5 E yjk lnX lnX + X mj lnQm lnXj. (8) 
i k=L,K m j 
The logarithmic marginal rates of transformation and logarithmic marginal products are 
C,W F,Z 
dlnQ,/dlnQm =am+ E 3mn lnQn+ _ OmjlnXj, m=R,C,W; (9a) 
n = R j = L,K 
C,W F,Z 
lnQ,/dlnXj=aj+ C mj lnQm + YjklnXk, j = L,K,F,Z. (9b) 
m = R k = L,K 
The most general regulatory condition is (7). It transforms conditions (9) to give 
PmQmIPlQI = - [(1-(1-KIS,)(1/77)) / (l-(1-KmSm)(l1/7m))] 
C,W F,Z 
X[am + E fmn lnQ,n+ mj ,lnXj] (10a) 
n = R j- = L,K 
C,W F,Z 
pjXj/P,IQ = (1-(l-K1SI)(l/,I7))[aj + Ctmj lnQm + E Yi lnXk]. (10b) 
m = R k = L,K 
The estimating equations are obtained by adding disturbances to the behavioral equations 
(10) and the transformation frontier (8). The resulting eight equations are estimated as a 
multivariate regression system. To avoid simultaneity bias caused by the endogeneity of all 
outputs and inputs, estimation employs the method of iterative nonlinear three stage least 
squares.16 Price and quantity data for the inputs and outputs are observed directly; the 
14. The derivation here parallels the development of a single-output model presented in Gollop and Karlson [19]. 
More detailed expositions of the modeling techniques employed in this research are presented in two unpublished 
working papers, Gollop and Karlson [20; 21]. 
15. The translog transformation function was introduced by Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau [9]. In order to 
reduce the number of parameters, industrial power is arbitrarily chosen as the "dependent variable" in (8). Different 
orderings of the outputs could result in different translog descriptions of the underlying technology. Diewert [12, 129] 
suggests that the resulting descriptions "... should be close in empirical applications since the different translog functions 
are all approximating the same technology to the second order." 
16. The eight instruments are a unitary constant, the prices of labor, capital and fuel inputs, and the numbers of 
residential, commercial, industrial and wholesale customers. 
77 
78 Stephen H. Karlson 
demand elasticities, technology coefficients and regulatory effect variables are estimable 
parameters. 
Hypotheses 
There are two groups of hypotheses which will be tested in this research. The first is a test of 
the appropriateness of the multiple-output specification of the structure of production. A 
sufficient test for multiple-output production is the rejection of the hypothesis of separa- 
bility'7 of inputs and outputs, which would allow (1) to be rewritten as 
Ql = G(f(QR, Qc, Q ), g(XL,XK,XF,XZ)). (11) 
The separability hypothesis involves 12 restrictions, 
Ho: ,mj = 0, all m, allj. (12) 
Separability of inputs from outputs implies that the marginal rate of substitution between 
any two inputs is independent of the quantities of outputs, and the marginal rate of trans- 
formation between any two outputs is independent of the quantities of inputs. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis of separability implies that the relative marginal costs of electricity sold 
to different consumer classes depend on the product and input mixes; furthermore, it is 
impossible to construct some homogeneous aggregate output called "electricity" to be sold 
to all customers.18 A multiple-output model of production is thus appropriate. 
The second group of hypotheses deals with the effect of regulation on pricing. The 
model specifies that regulators choose prices such that consumers do not face pure monopoly 
prices, but rather prices which deviate from pure monopoly prices in a way weighted by 
shares of consumption. Two null hypotheses are tested against this maintained hypothesis. 
The first hypothesis is "monopoly pricing": 
Ho: K = KR = KC = 0. (13) 
Under this null hypothesis, the prices permitted by the regulators are those chosen by a 
profit maximizing monopolist. The second hypothesis is "marginal cost pricing": 
Ho: KI = KR = KC = 0 and (14) 
1/-1i= 1I/R = 1/7 = 0. 
Under this null hypothesis, the regulators require the price of each kind of electricity to 
equal its marginal cost.'9 
17. The model imposes some separability in that an implicit transformation frontier is solved for one output. Such 
a solution can be postulated whenever the transformation frontier is well-behaved; the solution does not sacrifice any 
marginal rates of substitution or transformation, but it reduces the number of free parameters in the model. 
18. Although separability of inputs and outputs implies aggregation of output is possible, it does not imply that 
the marginal costs of all types of electricity are the same. Another step is required: is the marginal rate of transformation 
between any two outputs in the aggregate always unity? If so, a single-output production function could be used to 
model the production of electricity. If the marginal rate of transformation depends on input levels, it cannot be unity 
everywhere: rejection of separability is sufficient evidence of multiple-output production. 
19. If regulators impose marginal cost pricing on utilities, it does not follow that consumer demands for electricity 
are infinitely elastic. Rather, the utility must provide whatever electricity consumers demand at those prices; it will do so 
most efficiently if it selects inputs and outputs on the basis of those relative product and input prices. 
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III. Estimation and Test Results 
Data 
The econometric model is estimated on a sample of 28 privately-owned electric utilities 
which rely primarily on coal-fired generation. The sample is restricted to firms which have 
adopted a similar technology and exist in substantially similar market and regulatory envi- 
ronments.20 Engineering considerations and econometric research strongly suggest that 
generation technologies differ among fuel types.21 Coal-fired utilities have accounted for an 
increasing share of U.S. electricity production; in 1978, 44 percent of U.S. electricity was so 
produced [42, ii]. 
Firms which are either publicly owned or earn more than one-third of their revenue 
from the distribution of natural gas22 are excluded from the data set. Publicly owned utilities 
face different regulatory constraints; their managements may have different objectives from 
those of investor-owned utilities. Combination utilities are likely to share managers, billing 
services, maintenance and some physical plant between their electric and gas divisions. 
Utilities which purchase no power from wholesale markets or which fail to supply 
power to all four consumer classes are excluded from the data set. For such firms, conditions 
(4) may hold as inequalities, implying behavioral conditions (10) do not hold. 
The technological, institutional and mathematical selection criteria lead to a sample of 
28 utilities from an initial population of over 170 publicly and privately-owned firms. The 
econometric model, equations (8) and (10), is used to analyze the behavior of these firms in 
1978. 
The model is constructed under the assumption that firms are in long-run equilibrium. 
Data is gathered for the 28 firms for 1978. This calendar year predates the second oil shock 
of 1979 and the decontrol of crude oil prices in 1981. It is also well after the first OPEC 
shock of 1973. 
Most of the data required for the model are described in Gollop and Karlson [22]. 
Additional data are obtained directly from the Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utili- 
ties [43]. 
Input price and input expenditure data are described in [22]. Labor and fuel expendi- 
tures are obtained from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Capital input and 
capital expenditures are constructed using a data base prepared by Christensen, Gollop and 
Stevenson [8]. Purchased power expenditures are the imputed cost of purchased power and 
positive net interchanges: the measure of purchased power expenditures is thus different 
from that reported in [43] for those firms with negative net interchanges.23 
20. There are over 180 degrees of freedom in this estimating system since there are eight equations used to 
estimate no more than 42 parameters. 
21. Boyes [6, 28] discusses the differences in utility technology due to fuel choice. Gollop and Karlson [18] reject 
the hypothesis of identical coefficients in electric utility cost functions among regions of the U. S., implying differences in 
the underlying technology. The sample evaluated in this study is restricted to northern coal-fired electric utilities in order 
to make the observations more homogeneous. Northern utilities must keep their boilers and condensers enclosed to 
protect against severe winters; southern utilities often place much of this equipment outside. 
22. Of the 28 firms, 16 are purely electric utilities; no combination utility obtains more than 33 percent of its 1978 
revenues from gas sales. 
23. Interchanges are exchanges of power between generating companies, generally to reduce the cost of providing 
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Table I. Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 1.02a FF -.548 
fR -1.05 YFZ -5.3 X 10-' 
ac -.202 Yzz -5.1 X 10-5 
aw -.567b kRL -.215 
PRR -2.7 X 10-5 RK -.319 
IRC -6.1 X 10-4 RF .661 
PRW -4.4 X 10-3 RZ -.293 
Pcc -.014 OCL -.152 
fcw -.098 OCK .181 
18ww -.707 4CF .146 
aL .059 (cz 7.5 X 10-3 
aLK 1.54a kWL .260 
aF 1.45a WK .405 
az .182 k WF .443 
YLL -1.9 X 10-4 WZ .160 
YLK 4.6 X 103 7 2.14 
YLF .010 r/R 1.83 
'LZ 9.8 X 10-5 rc 1.22a 
YKK -.113 KI -1.3 X 10-4 
YKF -.249 KR 6.3 X 10-5 
YKZ -2.4 X 10-3 K -3.7 X 10-5 
a. Significant at the 95% level. 
b. Significant at the 90% level. 
Revenues for sales to residential, industrial and commercial customers, as well as quan- 
tities sold to these consumer classes, are reported in [43]. Physical sales for resale, and resale 
revenues, are not those reported in [43] for firms with negative net interchanges.24 In this 
paper, power which is interchanged out to other utilities is treated as a sale for resale. 
Hence, "sales for resale" is defined as the sum of reported sales for resale and the absolute 
value of negative net interchanges. The imputed revenue from sales for resale is computed 
such that the difference between revenue from sales for resale and purchased power expenses 
used in the data set is equal to the difference between those entries reported in [43]. 
Since the translog transformation frontier is an approximation based on a Taylor ex- 
pansion around zero, all input and output data are scaled to their means. 
Estimates 
The parameter estimates obtained by the multivariate regression system (expressions (8) 
and (10)) are reported in Table I. The estimates satisfy the efficiency conditions (symmetry, 
power, but sometimes to permit a generator to be taken out of service for maintenance. Interchanges differ from sales for 
resale, which arise when a utility with generating capacity sells power to another utility, generally a distribution utility 
with no generating capacity of its own. While [43] reports separate entries for quantities sold for resale or interchanged, 
one account, "purchased power expenses", contains both expenditures on purchased power (a positive number), and the 
balance resulting when utilities settle accounts for interchanges (which may be positive or negative for any firm). 
24. Six firms report negative purchased power expenses in [43]. The revenue and cost recalculations generate 
positive purchased power expenses (for purchases listed in [43]) and positive revenues from sales for resale (reflecting 
reported sales for resale and net interchanges out). 
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monotonicity and concavity) required by the theory of production. Symmetry is a main- 
tained hypothesis, imposed by specifying /mn = 3nm, ij = yji and ? im = ',mi. The monoto- 
nicity conditions are satisfied: each input's marginal product is positive in the input level, 
since a L, a K, a F and a z are all positive, while the marginal rate of transformation between 
kilowatt-hours produced for industrial use and electricity produced for each other customer 
class is negative, since a R, a c and a w are all negative. The sufficiency conditions for con- 
cavity are satisfied given the estimates of the own second-order input parameters y7, and 
output coefficients mm .25 Consequently, marginal products of inputs are positive and de- 
creasing functions of input levels, while marginal rates of transformation are negative and 
decreasing functions of output levels. 
Separability and Joint Production 
Although no i,, parameter is individually significant, the X2 statistic26 associated with the 
test of the separability hypothesis (12) is 59.563, well above the 99% critical value of 26.217 
with twelve degrees of freedom. Since inputs and outputs are not separable, the interdepen- 
dencies among the inputs and the outputs jointly exert a significant influence on the trans- 
formation possibilities. 
That the transformation function is not separable in inputs and outputs implies there 
are potential biases in some prior research. In Primeaux and Nelson [38], the marginal cost 
of electricity to each consumer class depends in part on the output mix at each firm's peak 
demand, but the input mix in generation is held invariant to output mix. In Meyer and 
Leland [30], marginal costs are markups of the fuel marginal cost; these are affected by 
neither the output mix nor the input mix. Hayashi, Sevier and Trapani report a model in 
which separability is maintained [23, 783]; they do not test this restriction. 
Regulated Pricing 
The parameters reported in Table I also permit some statements about the social welfare 
weights used by regulators in setting the prices of electricity faced by residential, commercial 
and industrial consumers. The null hypothesis (13) that KI = KR = KC = 0, i.e. that regulated 
prices are profit-maximizing prices cannot be rejected. The X2 statistic associated with the 
hypothesis test is 0.027, which is not statistically significant. 
This test statistic is not an artifact of the very nonlinear estimation system which 
emerges when all parameters in equations (8) and (10) are estimated. As a check on this 
possibility, I treated the Mount-Chapman-Tyrrell [32] average elasticity estimates as con- 
stants,27 estimating only the Km and the production parameters. In that model, the X2 statistic 
25. These coefficients are obtained under a reparameterization of the basic translog model which permits a check 
for concavity. The reparameterization follows Lau [29]. The coefficients obtained in an unrestricted translog model did 
not satisfy the concavity conditions; I imposed restrictions on the reparameterized model until the sufficiency conditions 
for concavity were satisfied. The reparameterization permits the calculation of all the second-order parameters, which are 
reported in Table I. 
26. All X2 statistics are calculated according to a procedure derived in Gallant and Jorgenson [17]. The test 
statistic T is based on the increase in the weighted mean-squared error of the regression system when the parametric 
restrictions are imposed. Its formula is T = N(trace(W'C, W) - trace(W'CfW)) where N is the number of observa- 
tions, W is the Choleski weighting matrix for the unrestricted model, C, is the covariance matrix of untransformed 
residuals of the restricted model and Cf is the covariance matrix of untransformed residuals in the unrestricted model. 
27. Eckel [13] and Nelson, Roberts and Tromp [33] both use Mount-Chapman-Tyrrell [32] elasticities as con- 
stants. 
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associated with setting three Km to zero was 1.05, still not significant. The 95% critical value 
of the X2 distribution with three degrees of freedom is 7.81. 
This result is surprising, since it is at odds with some published research and the insti- 
tutional wisdom that regulators "do something" to protect consumers against "monopoly" 
rates. Does the absence of any regulatory effect on pricing imply that regulators have failed 
at their task? 
First, prior research does not allow for the richness of substitution and transformation 
possibilities among inputs and outputs possible using the translog transformation frontier. 
Studies by Primeaux and Nelson [38], Meyer and Leland [30] and Hayashi, Sevier and 
Trapani [23] explicitly or implicitly assumed separability of inputs and outputs. Imposing 
separability leads to estimates of relative marginal costs which are incorrect. To show this, I 
estimated a model that imposed separability of inputs and outputs. In that model, the 
estimates of KI, KR and KC were, respectively, -.205, -.090 and -.039. When the null 
hypothesis of monopoly pricing was tested, a x2 statistic of 9.506 resulted: with 97.5 percent 
confidence, I would reject the null hypothesis that these prices were pure monopoly prices: 
furthermore, regulators would grant larger price concessions to industrial consumers than 
to residential or commercial customers with the same share of a utility's output. But those 
conclusions would be erroneous because the hypothesis of separability in production was 
rejected. Consequently, the estimates that regulation reduces electricity prices are due to 
specification error in the measurement of marginal cost. 
The papers by Eckel [13] and Nelson, Roberts and Tromp [33] do not impose separa- 
bility, but they also study different samples. Eckel's results are obtained from a 1970 sample 
of unreported size and composition. Nelson, Roberts and Tromp study 69 utilities in 1970 
and 1978. They do not specify the composition of the data set, which raises the possibility 
that utilities using different fuels, or different construction techniques, are included in the 
sample. This raises the possibility that their finding of an effect of regulation on utility prices 
(in both years, but 1978 is relevant to this study) is the result of an attempt to fit one cost 
function to diverse technologies. 
Second, the estimated long-run demand elasticities are larger than most prior esti- 
mates28 for residential and industrial demands, but smaller for commercial customers.29 
Consequently, the implicit profit-maximizing price associated with any marginal cost would 
be lower for residential and industrial users, and higher for commercial consumers, if these 
elasticities were used in preference to Mount, Chapman and Tyrrell [32] elasticities. Both 
Meyer and Leland [30] and Nelson [34] observed changes in relative regulated prices in 
favor of residential consumers. They attribute this change to regulatory policy; the results 
here would be equally due to rational pricing by utilities. 
Third, the hypothesis that regulation does not have an effect on pricing has been articu- 
lated previously. Stigler and Friedland [40] suggest that the ineffectiveness of regulation (of 
electric utility rates prior to 1937) can be due to one of two things: the monopoly power of 
the utility is slight; or the regulator is incapable of monitoring every decision of the firm. 
Posner [36, 34] contends "profit regulation may have little actual effect on monopoly prices 
28. See Taylor [41] and Nelson [34] for discussions of previous values of demand elasticities. 
29. Although the estimated elasticities of demand have similar values and the point estimate for each elasticity lies 
within the 95 percent confidence interval for any other elasticity, a test of the null hypothesis that all three elasticities are 
equal to each other leads to a X2 statistic of 68.27, well above the 99% critical value of 9.21 for two degrees of freedom. 
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and profits". Moore [31] presents evidence that regulation has little effect on prices charged 
by privately owned utilities.30 Hilton's [25, 50] "basic behavior of regulatory commissions" 
is to "generate monopoly gain ... [by] maintaining a monopoly, and then to dissipate it by 
uneconomic activity". 
Are any of these arguments valid for 28 regulated electric companies in 1978? Certainly 
regulators in 1978 face the same monitoring difficulties as their 1930s counterparts. But does 
the evidence show "slight" monopoly power or "uneconomic dissipation"? Stigler and Fried- 
land's dismissal of"monopoly power" for utilities is based on a very high long-run elasticity 
of demand for electricity (they use 8; the highest value reported in Taylor [41] is 2; the 
values in this paper are 2.14 or less). Alberts [1, 626] has shown that single-product firms 
facing demand elasticities in the unitary to 2 range are capable of earning above 100 percent 
rates of return. No utility in 1978 did that well. 
Consider, however that wholesale power is priced at its marginal cost. Furthermore, 
these multiproduct electric utilities operate under conditions of decreasing ray average 
cost.31 Baumol [3] demonstrates complete marginal cost pricing cannot cover all the costs of 
a firm operating under those cost conditions. The marginal cost pricing hypothesis is con- 
vincingly rejected: the X2 statistic for this test is 999.90; the 99% critical value with six 
degrees of freedom is 16.81. Given decreasing ray average cost, and given that wholesale 
power is priced at marginal cost, prices which cover the costs of the multiple product electric 
utility could be indistinguishable from prices chosen according to the monopoly price- 
discrimination rule.32 
Furthermore, some previous published research finds evidence of utility behavior not 
inconsisteit with the profit-maximizing hypothesis. Implicitly, the Averch-Johnson model 
of regulation carries with it the hypothesis of monopoly profit-maximizing behavior. Boyes 
[6, 28] observes that absent an Averch-Johnson effect, "the model collapses to the traditional 
non-regulated profit-maximizing model." Since neither Boyes nor Gollop and Karlson [19] 
found evidence of an Averch-Johnson input mix distortion, both provide evidence of profit- 
maximizing behavior by regulated firms. 
IV. Conclusions 
The multiple output model of production and consumption yields a number of implications. 
First, the multiple output specification is appropriate: electric utilities produce distinct 
products for markets with distinct demand characteristics. The research shows that different 
consumer classes have different elasticities of demand for electricity. The prices which con- 
sumers face are not different from those which would be chosen by a profit-maximizing 
monopolist. Given the evidence of decreasing ray average costs in this sample, however, 
such discriminatory prices may be necessary to cover the costs of the firms. Marginal cost 
30. Moore [31] presents a simple model in which a firm sells electricity only to residential customers. Its marginal 
cost is estimated by a linear regression. Moore's simplifications sacrifice many of the substitution and transformation 
possibilities analyzed here. 
31. These results are discussed in the working paper version of this research, which is available from me on 
request. 
32. Chapter 5 of volume I of Kahn [28] covers the role of price discrimination in covering the costs of natural 
monopolies. 
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pricing can not be sustained without subsidy under decreasing ray average costs. The null 
hypothesis of marginal cost pricing for all outputs was in fact rejected. 
Each consumer class buys a unique product, each output has a different marginal 
cost; each marginal cost depends on the mix of inputs and outputs in each firm. Hence 
researchers seeking evidence of price discrimination, cross-subsidization, or Ramsey pricing 
in electricity rates may create specification bias in their models by imposing separability. 
The regulatory policy implications drawn from the iurestricted model of production are 
very different from those obtained when separability is imposed. 
The research also illustrates the sensitivity of findings to the specification of models and 
the choice of data sets. 
Does the presence of natural monopoly in electricity production suggest that deregula- 
tion cannot be applied to electric utilities to the extent it has been applied in transportation? 
Joskow and Schmalensee [27] endorse this position: of four possible deregulatory scenarios 
they consider, three envision continued regulation of at least the distribution and trans- 
mission networks, which are viewed as the source of the natural monopoly. 
Their fourth scenario is complete deregulation of electric utilities. They rule out this 
policy [27, 154], arguing that deregulated firms would, in the short run, raise their prices 
further and engage in price discrimination to maximize their profits. The evidence in this 
paper suggests that these 28 regulated utilities were doing exactly that in 1978. Under 
complete deregulation, these consumers would be no worse off. There is in fact a possibility 
that consumer welfare could be improved under deregulation. All prices33 are at least as 
high as marginal costs in this sample. Production is at least cost, and ray average costs are 
declining. These conditions are among those necessary for the "sustainability" of a natural 
monopoly against entry. If the necessary conditions34 are satisfied, a deregulated natural 
monopoly can choose a set of output prices which will deter entry. Baumol, Bailey and 
Willig [4] show that, if there are prices sustainable against entry, those sustainable prices 
include Ramsey-optimal prices, i.e., prices that maximize social welfare yet cover all the 
costs of the regulated firm. Under deregulation, we would expect incumbent utilities to 
charge entry-deterring prices. If current regulated prices are higher than such prices, com- 
plete deregulation of electricity production could make consumers better off. 
33. This model uses average prices of electricity; a generalization would control for the "block" structure of 
electricity prices. Primeaux and Nelson [38] find "internal subsidization" in block pricing structures: the price of the last 
block of electricity is less than its marginal cost. They do not compute the stand-alone costs of power to each consumer 
group. 
34. The necessary conditions are presented in Panzar and Willig [35]. 
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